— In this paper we show that significant simplicity can be exploited for pricing-based control of large networks. We first consider a general loss network with Poisson arrivals...
The paper studies routing in loss networks in the framework of a non-cooperative game with selfish users. Two solution concepts are considered: the Nash equilibrium, corresponding...
Eitan Altman, Rachid El Azouzi, Vyacheslav M. Abra...
We consider the problem of allocating networked resources in dynamic environment, such as cloud computing platforms, where providers strategically price resources to maximize thei...
Bo An, Victor R. Lesser, David Irwin, Michael Zink
We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where n selfish agents install facilities over a network and connect to them, so as to forward their local demand (expressed...
— This paper considers a network flow control problem where routing and input rates are controlled in a decentralized way across a network, to optimize a global welfare objectiv...