We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Angelina ...
Abstract. A mechanism is manipulable if it is in some agents’ best interest to misrepresent their private information. The revelation principle establishes that, roughly, anythin...
Abstract— The pre-shared key based mechanisms for Transport Layer Security (TLS) were recently standardized by the IETF to extend the set of ciphersuites by utilizing existing ke...
Fang-Chun Kuo, Hannes Tschofenig, Fabian Meyer, Xi...
- The design of a spherical wrist with parallel architecture is the object of this article. This study is part of a larger project, which aims to design and to build an eel robot f...
We study a representative task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. The cost of each edge is privatel...