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AAAI
2012
12 years 12 months ago
A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations
Peer prediction mechanisms allow the truthful elicitation of private signals (e.g., experiences, or opinions) in regard to a true world state when this ground truth is unobservabl...
Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes
IAT
2009
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
Creating Incentives to Prevent Intentional Execution Failures
—When information or control in a multiagent system is private to the agents, they may misreport this information or refuse to execute an agreed outcome, in order to change the r...
Yingqian Zhang, Mathijs de Weerdt
ISAAC
2007
Springer
92views Algorithms» more  ISAAC 2007»
15 years 3 months ago
Using Nash Implementation to Achieve Better Frugality Ratios
Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish ag...
Chien-Chung Huang, Ming-Yang Kao, Xiang-Yang Li, W...
WINE
2005
Springer
180views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
15 years 3 months ago
Truth-Telling Reservations
We present a mechanism for reservations of bursty resources that is both truthful and robust. It consists of option contracts whose pricing structure induces users to reveal the tr...
Fang Wu, Li Zhang, Bernardo A. Huberman
WINE
2007
Springer
171views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
15 years 3 months ago
Characterizing Truthful Market Design
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...
Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov