We examine a class of wagering mechanisms designed to elicit truthful predictions from a group of people without requiring any outside subsidy. We propose a number of desirable pr...
Nicolas S. Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortma...
Traditional centralised approaches to security are difficult to apply to large, distributed marketplaces in which software agents operate. Developing a notion of trust that is ba...
Temporality and uncertainty are important features of many real world systems. Solving problems in such systems requires the use of formal mechanism such as logic systems, statisti...
Abstract—As the rapid expansion of smart phones and associated data-intensive applications continues, we expect to see renewed interest in dynamic prioritization schemes as a way...
Victor Shnayder, Jeremy Hoon, David C. Parkes, Vik...
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...