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ACMICEC
2003
ACM
172views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
15 years 5 months ago
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
15 years 5 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
141views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
15 years 5 months ago
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
CN
2007
111views more  CN 2007»
14 years 11 months ago
An auction mechanism for allocating the bandwidth of networks to their users
We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of sim...
Manos Dramitinos, George D. Stamoulis, Costas Cour...