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WWW
2010
ACM
15 years 6 months ago
How much is your personal recommendation worth?
Suppose you buy a new laptop and, simply because you like it so much, you recommend it to friends, encouraging them to purchase it as well. What would be an adequate price for the...
Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Ingmar Weber
IAT
2006
IEEE
15 years 5 months ago
Realising Common Knowledge Assumptions in Agent Auctions
Game theory is popular in agent systems for designing auctions with desirable properties. However, many of these properties will only hold if the game and its properties are commo...
Frank Guerin, Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine
AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
14 years 11 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan

Publication
216views
15 years 4 months ago
Dynamic Matching with a Fall-Back Option
We study dynamic matching without money when one side of the market is dynamic with arrivals and de- partures and the other is static and agents have strict prefer- ences over a...
Sujit Gujar, David Parkes
GLOBECOM
2006
IEEE
15 years 5 months ago
Two-phase Collision Avoidance to Improve Scalability in Wireless LANs
— IEEE 802.11 DCF exhibits poor scalability due to the large contention overhead. Therefore, the more the number of stations, the less the aggregate throughput. We propose a two-...
Seongil Han, Yongsub Nam, Yongho Seok, Taekyoung K...