520 search results - page 4 / 104 » Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions |
FOCS
2005
IEEE
13 years 12 months ago
2005
IEEE
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 6 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
AP2PC
2005
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2005
Springer
We analyze a mechanism that provides strong incentives for the submission of truthful feedback in virtual communities where services are exchanged on a peer-to-peer basis. Lying pe...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
13 years 12 months ago
2005
ACM
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
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Voted
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2010
ACM
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...