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» Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions
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IOR
2008
69views more  IOR 2008»
14 years 9 months ago
Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
Leon Yang Chu, Zuo-Jun Max Shen
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
129views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
14 years 9 months ago
Characterizing truthful mechanisms with convex type spaces
Aaron Archer, Robert Kleinberg
IJCAI
2007
14 years 11 months ago
Incremental Mechanism Design
Mechanism design has traditionally focused almost exclusively on the design of truthful mechanisms.
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
CORR
2010
Springer
95views Education» more  CORR 2010»
14 years 8 months ago
Single-Call Mechanisms
Following Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Slivkins [4], we study single-call mechanisms — truthful mechanisms that evaluate an allocation function only once per instantiation. First, w...
Balasubramanian Sivan, Christopher A. Wilkens
78
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WINE
2007
Springer
124views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
15 years 3 months ago
On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In p...
Qiqi Yan