520 search results - page 9 / 104 » Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions |
69
Voted
FOCS
2010
IEEE
14 years 7 months ago
2010
IEEE
We give the first black-box reduction from arbitrary approximation algorithms to truthful approximation mechanisms for a non-trivial class of multiparameter problems. Specifically,...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
15 years 3 months ago
2005
ACM
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
FOCS
2008
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
2008
IEEE
The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational ef ciency. We establish the rst significant approximability ...
77
Voted
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
15 years 2 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
80
Voted
ESA
2008
Springer
14 years 11 months ago
2008
Springer
A truthful mechanism consists of an algorithm augmented with a suitable payment function which guarantees that the "players" cannot improve their utilities by "chea...