Sciweavers

16 search results - page 2 / 4
» Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions
Sort
View
94
Voted
ATAL
2001
Springer
15 years 2 months ago
Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation and task assignment. In many cases the...
Felix Brandt, Gerhard Weiß
AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
14 years 10 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
82
Voted
AAAI
2000
14 years 11 months ago
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
94
Voted
DALT
2008
Springer
14 years 12 months ago
Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...
88
Voted
IAT
2008
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
Beyond Quasi-linear Utility: Strategy/False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocols
We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder ...
Yuko Sakurai, Yasumasa Saito, Atsushi Iwasaki, Mak...