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SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 26 days ago
2009
ACM
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 26 days ago
2009
ACM
We study the degree to which small fluctuations in costs in wellstudied potential games can impact the result of natural best-response and improved-response dynamics. We call thi...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 26 days ago
2009
ACM
We study the problem of how to allocate m identical items among n > m agents, assuming each agent desires exactly one item and has a private value for consuming the item. We as...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 26 days ago
2009
ACM
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 26 days ago
2009
ACM
There is significant experimental evidence that prediction markets are efficient mechanisms for aggregating information and are more accurate in forecasting events than tradition...