We report on a series of highly controlled human subject experiments in networked bargaining. The basic interaction between two players is the decision of how to share a mutual pa...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, J. Stephen Judd, Michael Kearn...
We derive efficient algorithms for both detecting and representing matchings in lopsided bipartite graphs; such graphs have so many nodes on one side that it is infeasible to repr...
Denis Charles, Max Chickering, Nikhil R. Devanur, ...
We conduct laboratory experiments on variants of market scoring rule prediction markets, under different information distribution patterns, in order to evaluate the efficiency an...
We analyze the complexity of computing pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in symmetric games with a fixed number of actions. We restrict ourselves to “compact” representati...
Christopher Thomas Ryan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin L...
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the ...