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136
Voted
WINE
2007
Springer
120
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Economy
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WINE 2007
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False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team
15 years 9 months ago
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www-scf.usc.edu
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purch...
Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahy...
claim paper
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