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133
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WINE
2009
Springer
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Economy
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WINE 2009
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Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
15 years 9 months ago
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www.andrew.cmu.edu
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi
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