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122
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SIGECOM
2004
ACM
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ECommerce
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SIGECOM 2004
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Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
15 years 9 months ago
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Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
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