: We revisit price of anarchy in network routing, in a new model in which routing decisions are made by self-interested components of the network, as opposed to by the flows as in ...
We consider Fisher and Arrow-Debreu markets under additively-separable, piecewise-linear, concave utility functions, and obtain the following results: ? For both market models, if...
: We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. W...
feuse of its devstting eets in utions nd other mehnismsD ollusion is prohiited nd leglly proseutedF etD olluders hve lwys existedD nd my ontinue to existF e thus rise the followin...
: We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic resu...