JET
2016
10 years 27 days ago
2016
On average, “young” people underestimate whereas “old” people overestimate their chances to survive into the future. We adopt a Bayesian learning model of ambiguous surviv...
JET
2016
10 years 27 days ago
2016
We analyze a principal-agent problem with moral hazard where a principal searches for an opportunity of uncertain return, and hires an agent to evaluate available options. The age...
JET
2016
10 years 27 days ago
2016
A seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment, with buyers that differ in their patience: Each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a p...
JET
2016
10 years 27 days ago
2016
This paper presents a collection of convergence results on best-response dynamics in extensive-form games. We prove that in all finite generic extensive-form games of perfect inf...
JET
2016
10 years 27 days ago
2016
We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We allow playe...