Sciweavers

MAGS
2010

Sequential auctions for common value objects with budget constrained bidders

12 years 9 months ago
Sequential auctions for common value objects with budget constrained bidders
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only have valuations for objects but also have budget constraints (i.e., constraints on how much they can actually spend in an auction). Given these constraints, the bidders' problem is to determine how much to bid in each auction. To this end, this paper analyzes the strategic behavior of bidders and determines the equilibrium bidding strategies for the individual auctions that constitute a series. We do this in an incomplete information setting where the bidders are uncertain about their budget constraints, and obtain equilibrium bidding strategies for the participants in individual auctions in a series.
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R.
Added 20 May 2011
Updated 20 May 2011
Type Journal
Year 2010
Where MAGS
Authors S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R. Jennings
Comments (0)