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MAGS
2010
92views more  MAGS 2010»
12 years 11 months ago
Sequential auctions for common value objects with budget constrained bidders
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only have valuations for obj...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
WINE
2010
Springer
168views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 1 months ago
On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competit...
Elias Koutsoupias, George Pierrakos
MOBIHOC
2010
ACM
13 years 2 months ago
Breaking bidder collusion in large-scale spectrum auctions
Dynamic spectrum auction is an effective solution to provide spectrum on-demand to many small wireless networks. As the number of participants grows, bidder collusion becomes a se...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
IEEEARES
2010
IEEE
13 years 2 months ago
Using Smart Cards for Tamper-Proof Timestamps on Untrusted Clients
Online auctions of governmental bonds and CO2 certificates are challenged by high availability requirements in face of high peak loads around the auction deadline. Traditionally, t...
Guenther Starnberger, Lorenz Froihofer, Karl M. G&...
SEKE
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
An Empirical Evaluation on the Relationship Between Final Auction Price and Shilling Activity in Online Auctions
In this paper, we are interested in the relationship between final prices of online auctions and possible shill activities during those auctions. We conduct experiments on real auc...
Fei Dong, Sol M. Shatz, Haiping Xu
MANSCI
2010
138views more  MANSCI 2010»
13 years 2 months ago
eBay's Crowded Evenings: Competition Neglect in Market Entry Decisions
: Do firms neglect competition when making entry decisions? Using a dataset of 14,973 eBay auctions this paper addresses this question analyzing the time of day at which sellers se...
Uri Simonsohn
JAIR
2010
139views more  JAIR 2010»
13 years 2 months ago
Multiattribute Auctions Based on Generalized Additive Independence
We develop multiattribute auctions that accommodate generalized additive independent (GAI) preferences. We propose an iterative auction mechanism that maintains prices on potentia...
Yagil Engel, Michael P. Wellman
AAMAS
2002
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
On the Natural Selection of Market Choice
An evolutionary approach to the problem of economic mechanism choice is presented. It demonstrates the power that a single participant has on the choice of a preferred market mecha...
Aviv Bergman, Moshe Tennenholtz
JAIR
2007
113views more  JAIR 2007»
13 years 4 months ago
Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents
In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a res...
Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, Quang Duong
AMAI
2005
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...
David C. Parkes