Consider an information network with harmful procedures called attackers (e.g., viruses); each attacker uses a probability distribution to choose a node of the network to damage. O...
Marios Mavronicolas, Vicky G. Papadopoulou, Anna P...
In this paper, we investigate the coverage problem in wireless sensor networks using a game theory method. We assume that nodes are randomly scattered in a sensor field and the goa...
We present a computational approach to the saddle-point formulation for the Nash equilibria of two-person, zero-sum sequential games of imperfect information. The algorithm is a ï¬...
We analyze the complexity of computing pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in symmetric games with a ï¬xed number of actions. We restrict ourselves to “compact†representati...
Christopher Thomas Ryan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin L...
In this paper, we adopt general-sum stochastic games as a framework for multiagent reinforcement learning. Our work extends previous work by Littman on zero-sum stochastic games t...