We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Angelina ...
Abstract. We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents and provide the first deterministic mechanisms with constant approximation that a...
Vincenzo Auletta, Roberto De Prisco, Paolo Penna, ...
We study the geometrical shape of the partitions of the input space created by the allocation rule of a truthful mechanism for multi-unit auctions with multidimensional types and ...
We consider the design of strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. We give two simple, but extremely versatile, black-box reductions, that in combination reduce the cost-sharing mec...
We study the problem of scheduling permanent jobs on unrelated machines when the objective is to minimize the Lp norm of the machine loads. The problem is known as load balancing ...