We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of...
Cryptographic protocol design in a two-party setting has often ignored the possibility of simultaneous message transmission by each of the two parties (i.e., using a duplex channe...
Formal analysis of security protocols based on symbolic models has been very successful in finding flaws in published protocols and proving protocols secure, using automated too...
In this paper we study security definitions for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. We observe that there are several families of attacks on AKE protocols that lie outsid...
Brian A. LaMacchia, Kristin Lauter, Anton Mityagin
We investigate efficient protocols for password-authenticated key exchange based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem. To date, most of the published protocols for password-authentic...