Combinatorial auctions can be used to reach efficient resource and task allocations in multiagent systems where the items are complementary. Determining the winners is NP-complete...
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that l...
Abstract. In this paper we introduce a new option pricing mechanism for reducing the exposure problem encountered by bidding agents with complementary valuations when participating...
Valentin Robu, Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Enrico H. Gerd...
In many auctions, agents bid more aggressively than selfinterest would prescribe. This can be explained by spite, where the agent's utility not only increases in the agent...