Sciweavers

197 search results - page 28 / 40
» Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Sort
View
AAAI
2000
14 years 11 months ago
Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations
Combinatorial auctions can be used to reach efficient resource and task allocations in multiagent systems where the items are complementary. Determining the winners is NP-complete...
Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri
86
Voted
FOCS
2003
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
135views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
15 years 3 months ago
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that l...
Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
ECAI
2010
Springer
14 years 11 months ago
Addressing the Exposure Problem of Bidding Agents Using Flexibly Priced Options
Abstract. In this paper we introduce a new option pricing mechanism for reducing the exposure problem encountered by bidding agents with complementary valuations when participating...
Valentin Robu, Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Enrico H. Gerd...
AAAI
2010
14 years 11 months ago
Asymmetric Spite in Auctions
In many auctions, agents bid more aggressively than selfinterest would prescribe. This can be explained by spite, where the agent's utility not only increases in the agent�...
Ankit Sharma, Tuomas Sandholm