Combinatorial auctions where bidders can bid on bundles of items can lead to more economical allocations, but determining the winners is NP-complete and inapproximable. We present...
Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, Davi...
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...
The ability to express preferences for specific tasks in multi-agent auctions is an important element for potential users who are considering to use such auctioning systems. This p...
We consider the problem of resource allocation and scheduling where information and decisions are decentralized, and our goal is to propose a market mechanism that allows resource...
Combinatorial auctions have been studied by the multiagent systems community for some time, since these auctions are an effective mechanism for resource allocation when agents are...