227 search results - page 17 / 46 » Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets |
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
HICSS
2007
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
2007
IEEE
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...
IAT
2009
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
2009
IEEE
As the use of automated negotiations becomes more mainstream, one key attribute that needs to be incorporated is a measure of a seller’s trust or reliability. In this paper, we ...
86
Voted
FOCS
2003
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
2003
IEEE
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
101
Voted
WSC
2008
15 years 14 days ago
2008
Combinatorial auctions, where buyers can bid on bundles of items rather than bidding them sequentially, often lead to more economically efficient allocations of financial resource...