220 search results - page 15 / 44 » Combinatorial auctions with externalities |
AAAI
2000
14 years 11 months ago
2000
Combinatorial auctions can be used to reach efficient resource and task allocations in multiagent systems where the items are complementary. Determining the winners is NP-complete...
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
HICSS
2007
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
2007
IEEE
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...
IAT
2009
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
2009
IEEE
As the use of automated negotiations becomes more mainstream, one key attribute that needs to be incorporated is a measure of a seller’s trust or reliability. In this paper, we ...
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FOCS
2003
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
2003
IEEE
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...