Motivated by the problem of querying and communicating bidders’ valuations in combinatorial auctions, we study how well different classes of set functions can be sketched. More...
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu,...
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...
Social networks are ubiquitous. The discovery of close-knit clusters in these networks is of fundamental and practical interest. Existing clustering criteria are limited in that c...
Nina Mishra, Robert Schreiber, Isabelle Stanton, R...
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...
Our research is motivated by a strong conviction that business processes in electronic enterprises can be designed to deliver high levels of performance through the use of mathemat...