Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elec...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
In an election held in a noisy environment, agents may unintentionally perturb the outcome by communicating faulty preferences. We investigate this setting by introducing a theore...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Gal A....
When exploring a game over a large strategy space, it may not be feasible or cost-effective to evaluate the payoff of every relevant strategy profile. For example, determining a p...
Patrick R. Jordan, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P...
We consider Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs), a simple model of cooperation among agents. This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that a...
Scoring rules are a broad and concisely-representable class of voting rules which includes, for example, Plurality and Borda. Our main result asserts that the class of scoring rul...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosensc...