13 search results - page 1 / 3 » Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auc... |
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2002
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
ATAL
2004
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
2004
Springer
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
14 years 3 months ago
2003
ACM
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
14 years 3 months ago
2003
ACM
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...
ATAL
2003
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
2003
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...