We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...
Since Chase and Simon presented their influential paper on perception in chess in 1973, the use of chunks has become the subject of a number of studies into the cognitive behavior ...
In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adv...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
We quantify the effect of Bayesian ignorance by comparing the social cost obtained in a Bayesian game by agents with local views to the expected social cost of agents having glob...
Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tenne...
We study coalitional games where the value of cooperation among the agents are solely determined by the attributes the agents possess, with no assumption as to how these attribute...