We present a 3D, probabilistic object-surface model, along with mechanisms for probabilistically integrating unregistered 2.5D views into the model, and for segmenting model instan...
Abstract. This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agen...
Rajdeep K. Dash, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings
—Design of a flapping mechanism for flapping wing micro air vehicles (FWMAV) is presented based on a mathematical model of insect thorax. This model also includes an aerodynami...
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmou...