Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions

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Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give a deterministic truthful mechanism, when the valuations are single-minded: when R is a collection of fat objects (respectively, axis-aligned rectangles) in the plane, there is a truthful mechanism with a 1 + - (respectively, log n )approximation of the social welfare (where n is an upper bound on the maximum integral coordinate of each rectangle). We also consider the non-single-minded case, and design a randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism with approximation guarantee O(1) (respectively, O(log m)).
George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmou
Added 15 Feb 2011
Updated 15 Feb 2011
Type Journal
Year 2010
Where WINE
Authors George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmoud Fouz
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