We introduce a class of mechanisms, called bidding clubs, for agents to coordinate their bidding in auctions. In a bidding club agents first conduct a “pre-auction” within th...
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz
Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Elizabeth Sk...
The need to understand dynamic behavior in auctions is increasing with the popularization of online auctions. Applications include designing auction mechanisms, bidding strategies...
We develop multiattribute auctions that accommodate generalized additive independent (GAI) preferences. We propose an iterative auction mechanism that maintains prices on potentia...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...