Using a model of agent behavior based around envy-reducing strategies, we describe an iterated combinatorial auction in which the allocation and prices converge to a solution in t...
The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
We are exploring the use of auction mechanisms to assign roles within a team of agents operating in a dynamic environment. Depending on the degree of collaboration between the agen...
Abstract. The standard business model in the sponsored search marketplace is to sell click-throughs to the advertisers. This involves running an auction that allocates advertisemen...
Sai-Ming Li, Mohammad Mahdian, Randolph Preston Mc...