In auction theory, agents are typically presumed to have perfect knowledge of their valuations. In practice, though, they may face barriers to this knowledge due to transaction co...
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
We develop models of automated E-commerce techniques, which predict the economic outcomes of these decision mechanisms, including the price attained by a good and the resulting inc...
As the use of automated negotiations becomes more mainstream, one key attribute that needs to be incorporated is a measure of a seller’s trust or reliability. In this paper, we ...
Guruprasad Airy, Po-Chun Chen, Tracy Mullen, John ...
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...