Market mechanisms solve distributed scheduling problems by allocating the scheduled resources according to market prices. We model distributed scheduling as a discrete resource al...
William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wur...
We investigate a framework where agents search for satisfying products by using referrals from other agents. Our model of a mechanism for transmitting word-of-mouth and the result...
Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping theory — particularly secretary problems — in the design of approximately optimal on...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Tu...
We consider the problem of distributed task allocation across swarm units comprising a swarm-based system. We model task allocation as a dynamic pricing problem within a market se...
The music industry is planning to perform a significant shift toward the digital world by partnering cellphone network operators to build a mobile music market. In this paper we ...