Formal analysis of security protocols based on symbolic models has been very successful in finding flaws in published protocols and proving protocols secure, using automated too...
We promote an engineering approach to design of provably secure key exchange protocols. Using the model of Canetti and Krawczyk we present a systematic method to arrive at efficie...
Yiu Shing Terry Tin, Colin Boyd, Juanma Gonz&aacut...
Minimizing complexity of group key exchange (GKE) protocols is an important milestone towards their practical deployment. An interesting approach to achieve this goal is to simplif...
M. Choudary Gorantla, Colin Boyd, Juan Manuel Gonz...
A definition of secure multi-party key exchange in the Canetti-Krawczyk proof model is proposed, followed by a proof of the security of the Joux tripartite key agreement protocol...
Yvonne Hitchcock, Colin Boyd, Juan Manuel Gonz&aac...
We propose a four-party password authenticated interdomain key exchange protocol which makes use of properties of identity-based cryptography and secret public keys. Being passwor...