Sciweavers

41 search results - page 5 / 9
» On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions
Sort
View
AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
14 years 9 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
66
Voted
SODA
2004
ACM
128views Algorithms» more  SODA 2004»
14 years 11 months ago
Frugality in path auctions
We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s-t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner...
Edith Elkind, Amit Sahai, Kenneth Steiglitz
INFOCOM
2010
IEEE
14 years 8 months ago
Wireless Network Virtualization as A Sequential Auction Game
—We propose a virtualization framework to separate the network operator (NO) who focuses on wireless resource management and service providers (SP) who target distinct objectives...
Fangwen Fu, Ulas C. Kozat
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
To preempt or not: Tackling bid and time-based cheating in online spectrum auctions
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...
Lara B. Deek, Xia Zhou, Kevin C. Almeroth, Haitao ...
ECAI
2008
Springer
14 years 11 months ago
A Truthful Two-Stage Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilistic Estimates with Unknown Costs
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H...