Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s-t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner...
—We propose a virtualization framework to separate the network operator (NO) who focuses on wireless resource management and service providers (SP) who target distinct objectives...
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...
Lara B. Deek, Xia Zhou, Kevin C. Almeroth, Haitao ...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H...