262 search results - page 3 / 53 » Robust mechanisms for information elicitation |
IJCAI
2007
14 years 11 months ago
2007
Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation protocols that work well in the face of self-interested agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for automa...
ATAL
2011
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2011
Springer
Proper scoring rules, particularly when used as the basis for a prediction market, are powerful tools for eliciting and aggregating beliefs about events such as the likely outcome...
ATAL
2004
Springer
15 years 2 months ago
2004
Springer
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...
ATAL
2003
Springer
15 years 2 months ago
2003
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
CORR
2002
Springer
14 years 9 months ago
2002
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...