We consider the problem of detecting covert channels within security-enforcing object-capability patterns. Traditional formalisms for reasoning about the security properties of obj...
We develop the theme of an earlier paper [3], namely that security protocols for pervasive computing frequently need to exploit empirical channels and that the latter can be classi...
Sadie Creese, Michael Goldsmith, Richard Harrison,...
—This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side-channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how mo...
Bart Coppens, Ingrid Verbauwhede, Koen De Bosscher...
Side channels are typically viewed as attacks that leak cryptographic keys during cryptographic algorithm processing, by observation of system side effects. In this paper, we pres...
Albert Tannous, Jonathan T. Trostle, Mohamed Hassa...
We present the architecture, design issues and functions of a MIX-based system for anonymous and unobservable real-time Internet access. This system prevents traffic analysis as ...