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AAAI
2010
14 years 11 months ago
Asymmetric Spite in Auctions
In many auctions, agents bid more aggressively than selfinterest would prescribe. This can be explained by spite, where the agent's utility not only increases in the agent�...
Ankit Sharma, Tuomas Sandholm
FLAIRS
2006
14 years 11 months ago
Coalition Formation Meets Information Theory
The process of coalition formation, where distinct autonomous agents come together to act as a coherent group is an important form of interaction in multiagent systems. Previous w...
Victor Palmer, Thomas R. Ioerger
ATAL
2010
Springer
14 years 10 months ago
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors
We investigate the problem of allocating items (private goods) among competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and paymentfree. Specifically, we focus on allocating mu...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
CORR
2008
Springer
162views Education» more  CORR 2008»
14 years 9 months ago
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Ev...
POPL
2001
ACM
15 years 9 months ago
Type-preserving garbage collectors
By combining existing type systems with standard typebased compilation techniques, we describe how to write strongly typed programs that include a function that acts as a tracing ...
Daniel C. Wang, Andrew W. Appel