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» Stable partitions in coalitional games
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ATAL
2008
Springer
14 years 11 months ago
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments
Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered i...
Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsu...
AI
2006
Springer
14 years 9 months ago
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish thing...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
125views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
15 years 3 months ago
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish thing...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
CORR
2010
Springer
197views Education» more  CORR 2010»
14 years 8 months ago
Hedonic Coalition Formation for Distributed Task Allocation among Wireless Agents
—Autonomous wireless agents such as unmanned aerial vehicles, mobile base stations, or self-operating wireless nodes present a great potential for deployment in next-generation w...
Walid Saad, Zhu Han, Tamer Basar, Mérouane ...
CORR
2010
Springer
144views Education» more  CORR 2010»
14 years 9 months ago
Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
We conduct a computational analysis of partitions in additively separable hedonic games that satisfy standard criteria of fairness and optimality. We show that computing a partiti...
Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig