We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
Because of privacy concerns, agents may not want to reveal information that could be of use in problem solving. As a result, there are potentially important tradeoffs between main...
In an election held in a noisy environment, agents may unintentionally perturb the outcome by communicating faulty preferences. We investigate this setting by introducing a theore...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Gal A....
A problem of planning for cooperative teams under uncertainty is a crucial one in multiagent systems. Decentralized partially observable Markov decision processes (DECPOMDPs) prov...
—Traditional approaches for wireless sensor network diagnosis are mainly sink-based. They actively collect global evidences from sensor nodes to the sink so as to conduct central...