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» Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions
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WINE
2010
Springer
134views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 5 months ago
Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmou...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 28 days ago
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ļ¬...
Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe, Tami Tamir
IACR
2011
87views more  IACR 2011»
12 years 7 months ago
Is privacy compatible with truthfulness?
In the area of privacy-preserving data mining, a diļ¬€erentially private mechanism intuitively encourages people to share their data truthfully because they are at little risk of ...
David Xiao
AAAI
2006
13 years 8 months ago
Mechanisms for Partial Information Elicitation: The Truth, but Not the Whole Truth
We examine a setting in which a buyer wishes to purchase probabilistic information from some agent. The seller must invest effort in order to gain access to the information, and m...
Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 16 days ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efļ¬cient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the biddersā...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm