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466views
15 years 8 months ago
Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions
In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are cur- rently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) c...
Akash Das Sarma, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
SODA
2012
ACM
203views Algorithms» more  SODA 2012»
12 years 12 months ago
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
We consider the design of strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. We give two simple, but extremely versatile, black-box reductions, that in combination reduce the cost-sharing mec...
Konstantinos Georgiou, Chaitanya Swamy
AAIM
2005
Springer
75views Algorithms» more  AAIM 2005»
15 years 3 months ago
Mechanism Design for Set Cover Games When Elements Are Agents
In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets,...
Zheng Sun, Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wang, Xiaowen Ch...
APPROX
2004
Springer
113views Algorithms» more  APPROX 2004»
15 years 2 months ago
Computationally-Feasible Truthful Auctions for Convex Bundles
In many economic settings, convex figures on the plane are for sale. For example, one might want to sell advertising space on a newspaper page. Selfish agents must be motivated ...
Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen
ICDCSW
2006
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
Enforcing Truthful-Rating Equilibria in Electronic Marketplaces
Reputation-based mechanisms and policies are vulnerable to the submission of untruthful ratings. In this paper, we define and analyze a game-theoretic model that captures the dyn...
Thanasis G. Papaioannou, George D. Stamoulis