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» Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions
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FOCS
2003
IEEE
15 years 2 months ago
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
CORR
2011
Springer
180views Education» more  CORR 2011»
14 years 1 months ago
Lower Bound for Envy-Free and Truthful Makespan Approximation on Related Machines
We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan in the setting where machines are strategic agents. In this problem, each job j has a lengt...
Lisa Fleischer, Zhenghui Wang
93
Voted
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
15 years 4 months ago
Approximate mechanism design without money
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
JAIR
2007
103views more  JAIR 2007»
14 years 9 months ago
Obtaining Reliable Feedback for Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms
Reputation mechanisms offer an effective alternative to verification authorities for building trust in electronic markets with moral hazard. Future clients guide their business...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
72
Voted
ALDT
2009
Springer
126views Algorithms» more  ALDT 2009»
15 years 1 months ago
On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to players having additive utility functions over the items. We consider allocations in which no player envies the bun...
Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiot...