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» Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
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CEEMAS
2007
Springer
14 years 18 days ago
Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
Future agent mediated eCommerce will involve open systems of agents interoperating between different institutions, where different auction protocols may be in use. We argue that i...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
117views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 12 months ago
First-price path auctions
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
Alexander Kress, Craig Boutilier
JSAC
2008
101views more  JSAC 2008»
13 years 6 months ago
Sequential Bandwidth and Power Auctions for Distributed Spectrum Sharing
We study a sequential auction for sharing a wireless resource (bandwidth or power) among competing transmitters. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auction...
Junjik Bae, Eyal Beigman, Randall A. Berry, Michae...
MOBIHOC
2010
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
Breaking bidder collusion in large-scale spectrum auctions
Dynamic spectrum auction is an effective solution to provide spectrum on-demand to many small wireless networks. As the number of participants grows, bidder collusion becomes a se...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng