A common approach to analyzing repeated auctions, such as sponsored search auctions, is to treat them as complete information games, because it is assumed that, over time, players...
We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents' locat...
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmou...
We consider profit-maximization problems for combinatorial auctions with non-single minded valuation functions and limited supply. We obtain fairly general results that relate the ...
Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmoud Fouz, Chaitanya Swam...
Abstract. We present a new technique for analyzing the rate of convergence of local dynamics in bargaining networks. The technique reduces balancing in a bargaining network to opti...
Abstract. We study the interaction between network effects and external incentives on file sharing behavior in Peerto-Peer (P2P) networks. Many current or envisioned P2P networks r...
Abstract. Most existing market maker mechanisms for prediction markets are designed for events with a finite number of outcomes. All known attempts on designing market makers for f...
Abstract. We show a formal duality between certain equilibrium concepts, including the correlated and coarse correlated equilibrium, and analysis frameworks for proving bounds on t...
We introduce a new solution concept for games, near-strong equilibrium, a variation of strong equilibrium. Previous work has shown the existence of 2-strong pure strategy equilibr...
We propose a new proxy bidding mechanism to allocate courses to students given students' reported preferences. Our mechanism is motivated by a specific strategic downgrading m...
Scott Duke Kominers, Mike Ruberry, Jonathan Ullman