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WINE
2010
Springer
134views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 5 months ago
Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmou...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
131views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
Truthful germs are contagious: a local to global characterization of truthfulness
We study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social unction f from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, i.e. implementable by a truthful mechanis...
Aaron Archer, Robert Kleinberg
ESA
2008
Springer
195views Algorithms» more  ESA 2008»
13 years 9 months ago
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Angelina ...
STACS
2004
Springer
14 years 25 days ago
Deterministic Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Related Machines
Abstract. We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents and provide the first deterministic mechanisms with constant approximation that a...
Vincenzo Auletta, Roberto De Prisco, Paolo Penna, ...
IFIP
2004
Springer
14 years 26 days ago
Truthful Mechanisms for Generalized Utilitarian Problems
In this paper we investigate extensions of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms to problems whose objective function is not utilitarian and whose agents’ utiliti...
Giovanna Melideo, Paolo Penna, Guido Proietti, Rog...
AAIM
2005
Springer
75views Algorithms» more  AAIM 2005»
14 years 1 months ago
Mechanism Design for Set Cover Games When Elements Are Agents
In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets,...
Zheng Sun, Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wang, Xiaowen Ch...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
105views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
14 years 1 months ago
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
Ming-Yang Kao, Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wang
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
122views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
14 years 1 months ago
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
ICALP
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Mechanism Design for Fractional Scheduling on Unrelated Machines
In this paper, we consider the mechanism design version of the fractional variant of the scheduling problem on unrelated machines. We give a lower bound of 2 − 1/n for any fracti...
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annam&aac...