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233
Voted
SAGT
2015
Springer
36views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
10 years 11 days ago
When Can Limited Randomness Be Used in Repeated Games?
Pavel Hubácek, Moni Naor, Jonathan Ullman
223
Voted
SAGT
2015
Springer
27views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
10 years 11 days ago
Commitment in First-Price Auctions
Yunjian Xu, Katrina Ligett
195
Voted
SAGT
2015
Springer
35views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
10 years 11 days ago
Algorithmic Signaling of Features in Auction Design
In many markets, products are highly complex with an extremely large set of features. In advertising auctions, for example, an impression, i.e., a viewer on a web page, has numerou...
Shaddin Dughmi, Nicole Immorlica, Ryan O'Donnell, ...
190
Voted
SAGT
2015
Springer
18views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
10 years 11 days ago
Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensing
In Smart City and Participatory Sensing initiatives the key concept is for user communities to contribute sensor information and form a body of knowledge that can be exploited by i...
Georgios Birmpas, Costas Courcoubetis, Ioannis Gio...
190
Voted
SAGT
2015
Springer
34views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
10 years 11 days ago
"Beat-Your-Rival" Routing Games
In the traditional setting of routing games, the standard assumption is that selfish agents are unconcerned with the performance of their competitors in the network. We propose an...
Gideon Blocq, Ariel Orda
Game Theory
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