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233
Voted
SAGT
2015
Springer
36views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
10 years 10 days ago
When Can Limited Randomness Be Used in Repeated Games?
Pavel Hubácek, Moni Naor, Jonathan Ullman
223
Voted
SAGT
2015
Springer
27views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
10 years 10 days ago
Commitment in First-Price Auctions
Yunjian Xu, Katrina Ligett
195
Voted
SAGT
2015
Springer
35views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
10 years 10 days ago
Algorithmic Signaling of Features in Auction Design
In many markets, products are highly complex with an extremely large set of features. In advertising auctions, for example, an impression, i.e., a viewer on a web page, has numerou...
Shaddin Dughmi, Nicole Immorlica, Ryan O'Donnell, ...
190
Voted
SAGT
2015
Springer
18views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
10 years 10 days ago
Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensing
In Smart City and Participatory Sensing initiatives the key concept is for user communities to contribute sensor information and form a body of knowledge that can be exploited by i...
Georgios Birmpas, Costas Courcoubetis, Ioannis Gio...
189
Voted
SAGT
2015
Springer
28views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
10 years 10 days ago
Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods
Abstract. We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods using the leading notion of fairness in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two...
Simina Brânzei, Hadi Hosseini, Peter Bro Mil...
Game Theory
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